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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
No. 9587 
CRAIG CALDWELL and ROBERT 
E. COVINGTON, dba CALDWELL 
AND COVINGTON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ANSCHULTZ DRILLING CO~iP ANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
On appeal from a Judgment for Defendant entered 
by the District Court of Uintah County, Utah, the 
Honorable Joseph E. Nelson, Judge. 
STATE~!ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent agrees that this is an action wherein 
plaintiffs seek a decree of specific performance requir-
ing defendant to convey to plaintiffs certain oil and 
gas leases, with an alternative prayer for damages for 
breach of alleged contract, in the event specific per-
formance is impossible. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Over defendant's objection a jury was impaneled 
to try the case. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evi-
dence, the trial court took the case from the jury and 
granted defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of dis-
missal and a direction for a new trial. Defendant seeks 
affirmance of the judgment as entered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With small but important exceptions hereinafter 
noted, plaintiffs statement of facts is correct so far 
as it goes; however, it omits some facts necessary to 
a full consideration and proper disposition of the case, 
so that defendant is under the necessity of correcting 
and supplementing the same. 
As indicated, the plaintiffs brought this action for 
specific performance. Damages are asked for only in 
the event "specific performance of said contract is not 
granted." See plaintiffs' complaint herein. 
Defendant by its answer denied the existence of 
the alleged contract on "\Yhich plaintiffs based their~ 
action, and as a further affirmative defense alleged 
that plaintiffs had rejected the defendant's offer to 
enter into a proposed contract, and that thereafter the 
defendant entered into a binding agreement with a third 
party to sell the subject leases to such a third party, 
which affirmative def<>nse was placed in issue under 
the rules. Insamuch as the action 'vas terminated at 
the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, there is no evidence 
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in the rPeord \\·ith respect to thi~ alleged contract of 
~alP to n third party, and nothing appears in the record 
befor<' this eourt to sho\v that it would be either impos-
~ihle or inequitable to decree specific perfor1nance if 
an enforceable contract were found to exist in fact and 
1n la \V. 
()n the pleadings 1nentioned, plaintiffs filed a de-
Inand for a jury trial. Defendant 1noved to strike the 
demand for jury trial upon the ground that the action 
\Va~ essentially and primarily one for specific perform-
ance in which plaintiffs were not entitled to jury trial, 
but in which, on the contrary, defendant was entitled 
to have the court determine the facts, and particularly 
the facts relating to the existence or non-existence of 
the alleged contract. Defendant's motion was denied 
and a jury impaneled to try the case, but, as indicated, 
at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, on defendant's 
motion the court took the case from the jury and en-
tered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice upon the 
ground that plaintiffs had failed to prove a claim upon 
which any relief could be granted. The specific basis 
for this motion and ruling was that plaintiffs had failed· 
to prove an existing, enforceable contract. 
It must be carefully noted that there is no proof, 
and indeed plaintiffs do not claim, that any consider-
ation was given to defendant for the offer to sell em-
bodied in the proposed draft contract, plaintiffs Eoc-
hibit 3. It does not appear that plaintiffs contend, and 
indeed they cannot contend, that this was a legally bind-
ing option by \vhich defendant was required to keep its 
offer open for any specified time. 
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The certified check which paragraph 4 of this writ-
ten offer requires to be delivered contemporaneously 
with the execution of the contract by the buyer is stated 
to be "hereinafter referred to as 'earnest money'." As 
stated in paragraph 9 of the offer (quoted on page 3 
of plaintiffs' brief) the defendant seller specifically 
stipulated the conditions for the acceptance of the offer 
which must be met before the offer would ripen into a 
binding contract: (1) This contract must be executed 
by buyer; (2) The "earnest money" must be received 
by seller on or before February 23, 1961; and (3) An 
executed copy of the contract must be received by seller 
on or before that date. 
On page 3 of plaintiffs' brief it is asserted that 
Mr. Lynch, defendant's president, told plaintiffs that 
"paragraph No. 9 need not be complied with as long 
as it was understood that a deal had been made." This 
is not true. The only evidence in the record is the stipu-
lated testimony of plaintiff Cald,Yell that on February 
22 Mr. Lynch "informed me that the deal was made 
and that I need not be concerned about tlze tin1e ele1nent 
specified in paragraph 9 of the contract." 
The plaintiffs sent the unsigned contract back 
to their attorney, Allo,vay, in Denver, with specific 
limited authority and instructions contained in t'vo 
separate letters, plaintiffs' Exhibits 4 and 5, 'vhich 
were enclosed "~i th the unsigned contract. Plain-
tiffs called Allo,vay as their 'vitness. Allo,vay, an at-
torney of Denver, Colorado, under~tood and testified, 
and also told defendant's president, :\Ir. Lynch, that his 
agency and authority 'vere lin1ited in accordance with 
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his lPttPr of inst ruetions. \Yhen he \\'ent to ~t>P L~·nc-h 
about con~ ununa t ing thP offered contract, he Htold 
hitn n1~· agenr.y authority \Yas limited to the agency 
agreentPHt \Yhich I had taken from Caldwell and l~ov­
ington." (Tr. 56, line 6) Alloway also testified (Tr. 
7;~, line 30 to 7 4, line 2) "The agency called for execut-
ing in accordance with the letter of instructions. I 
was exceeding 1ny agency if I went proper." 
The letter of plaintiff~, Exhibit 4, granted Allo-
\vay authority uto execute the contract of sale ... 'vith 
\vhatever modifications consistent with our letter to you 
of this date \vhich you can effect." The accompanying 
letter of the same date contains the following: 
~'The following changes will be desired by 
us, 'vhich are stated herein, and will be revised 
according to our instructions to you, together 
\Yith any and all changes for our benefit which 
you may see feasible to change." 
Exhibit 5 then specifies certain particular changes re-
lating to "\Varranties of title, permission for assignment 
and payment of delay rentals. 
No check, certified or other, was sent to Alloway 
for use by him in meeting the requirements of para-
graphs 4 and 9 of the written offer. (Tr. 65, lines 10 
to 17.) 
~lr. Allo,vay was therefore confronted with the 
nece~sity of "\vriting his own check. This he hesitated 
to do, as he hesitated to assure ~Ir. Lynch that "he 
had the deal." ( Tr. 72, line 21 to 73, line 9.) This was 
understandable in the light of Alloway's limited author-
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ity( (Exhibit 5), and the fact that the money he had 
available in his account was money received from a 
Mr. Stableford which which had been delivered to him 
for the specific purpose of paying another draft in 
another deal. (Tr. 78). After Alloway received the 
unsigned contract from plaintiffs at 2 :50 p. m. on 
February 24th, he hurried to defendant's office, which 
is on the fourteenth floor of an office building. In so 
doing he passed within fifty yards of his bani\:. He had 
read the offered contract and knew the requirements 
of a certified check. He did not pause to get his check 
certified for the reason that he did not know that the 
bank stopped certifying checks at three o'clock. (Tr. 
77, line 20 to 72, line 8) He had read paragraph 9 of 
the offer on the way over. (Tr. 68, line 11 and 77, lines 
3 to 13). 
After defendant's president had refused to 1nake 
any modifications in the offered contract as requested 
by Alloway in accordance with his instructions in Ex-
hibit 5, and had refused Alloway's personal check be-
cause it was uncertified, Alloway asked Lynch to go 
down to the bank with him, apparently to cash the check, 
and ~lr. Lynch refused to accompany him to the bank. 
(Tr. 6, lines 23 to 27, and 59, lines 11 to 16.) Alloway 
testified that Lynch said cash 'vas not acceptable, b1.tt 
there is no el:idence or claiJn that cash u·as ever actually 
tendered to him. 
After Alloway's unsuccessful attempt to get his 
check certified and the refusal by defendant's officers 
of his second offer of his uncertified check, Alloway 
concluded the negotiations by stating, .. If you are not 
bound, I am not bonnd." He then returned to the office, 
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taking ,,·ith hin1 the unsigned copy of the offered con-
tract, together \vith his uncertified check. The offered 
contract was never signed hy or in behalf of plaintiffs. 
Neither was it ever delivered to or received by defend-
ant. By his ~tatement, he intended to mean that if one 
party \\·as not bound by the contract, neither was the 
other, and if the uncertified check was not acceptable, 
there ,,·as no point in signing the contract and he could 
do nothing n1ore about the situation. ( Tr. 59, line 29, 
to60, line 2; 78, lines 20 to 27; 60, line 1~; and 76, line 
29, to 77, line 2.) 
'Vhen on the follo,ving Saturday morning Alloway 
called and said he had a check from Mr. Stableford for 
the full amount of the purchase price (uncertified) and 
that he was \villing to bring it over if acceptable, defend-
ant's President, ~[r. Lynch, told Alloway, "No, I am 
sorry, '"'e have got another commitment until Monday 
noon, the 27th." (Tr. 61, lines 21 to 25.) 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
1. The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law 
to prove an enforceable contract for the sale and purch-
ase of the leases. 
2. The controlling issue of the existence of a con-
tract was triable to the court, and the court acted pro--
perly in deciding the issue, instead of sttbmitting it to 
the jury. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT 1. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT 
AS A :JIATTER OF LAW TO PROVE AN ENFORCE-
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ABLE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE AND PUR-
CHASE OF THE LEASES. 
That there was no contract consummated between 
the parties seems almost too clear for argument. There 
never was and never has been any meeting of the minds. 
The essence of the situation is this: At plaintiffs' 
suggestion, defendant on February 17th sent to plain-
tiffs a written offer to enter into a contract, specifying, 
as defendant had a right to do, with particularity and 
clarity the three concurrent acts necessary to an ac-
ceptance of the offer and fixing a time limit for such 
acceptance. There is evidence that the time limit was 
waived, but there is no evidence that the three specified 
conditions constittttting the manner of acceptance were 
ever waived. There was no contract or enforceable 
agreement to keep the offer open for any specified time 
or any reasonable time. Plaintiffs rejected the defend-
ant's offer by making a counter-offer through their 
agent, Alloway, and shortly thereafter the offer was 
withdrawn by defendant, 'vho advised plaintiffs' agent 
that the leases had been committed to a third party, and 
there could be no further dealings under the offer. 
Plaintiffs have never to this date (1) signed the con-
tract, (2) delivered or tendered an executed copy thereof 
to defendant, or (3) delivered or tendered to defendant 
the certified check required as earnest money. These 
were the three concurrent conditions for the acceptance 
of the offer, all clearly specified in the offer and never 
waived. 
The contention of the plaintiffs that all of the 
conditions of acceptance specified 1n paragraph 9 of 
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the offer \Vere verbally 'vaived is, as \Ye have seen, en-
tirely unsupported in the record. The only evidence in 
the rPeord is plaintiff Caldwell's stipulated testimony 
that defendant'~ president Lynch, on February 22, in 
a telephone conversation, inforrned him "that the deal 
was made and that I need not be concerned about the 
titne element" speeified in paragraph 9 of said contract. 
Clearl~T the only \vaiver was of the ''time elernent." The 
evidence clearly and unequivocally shows, without any 
question, that both parties understood and knew that 
there \Vas no waiver of the other requirements of para-
graph 9 specifying the manner and conditions of accept-
ance of the offer. In the first place it is clear and un-
disputed that plaintiffs did not consider themselves 
bound by the terms of the offer as written, even disre-
garding all of paragraph 9, for they immediately after-
\Vards telephoned and mailed their agent Alloway in-
structions to procure modifications in the other terms 
of the offer, relating to warranty, rental payments, etc., 
before executing the contract in their behalf, and their 
attorney-agent .A.Jloway failed to procure a certified 
check only because he did not know that he could not 
procure certification later in the day. Further, All-
O\\Tay testified that he never signed or offered to sign, 
or delivered or offered to deliver an executed copy of 
the contract, and that he took the offer with him after 
his counter-offer was rejected, and that he "neglected" 
to sign and tender delivery of the contract because de-
fendant refused to accept his uncertified check and he 
couldn't get it certified so "What could he do-" 
It is to be noted that Alloway never testified or 
claimed in the conversation with defendant's represen-
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tatives that defendant had waived the requirement of a 
certified check, or had waived the requirements of the 
signing and actual delivery of the written contract. It 
seems certain that if plaintiffs had understood that 
defendant had waived these requirements, they would 
so have informed their agent, and he would have re-
minded defendant's officers during the two-hour-long 
negotiations for modifications in the offer and the argu-
ments over 1\Ir. Alloway's check as being as good as a 
certified check. 
The testimony clearly shows that Alloway did not 
feel that he had authority to execute a contract under 
his oral and written instructions unless the proposed 
contract was first modified in matters respecting war-
ranty of title and warranty of payment of rentals. He 
testified positively that he considered he was exceeding 
his authority in indicating that he would close on the 
terms of the written offer, provided his personal check 
were accepted in lieu of the certified check specified. 
That he "\Vas exceeding his authority is clear from his 
testimony as well as from his testimony that he con-
sulted with the California company \vith \vhom his prin-
cipals were dealing about the requirements of \varranty 
and tried unsuccessfully to get a commitment from those 
people. 
Plaintiff Cald\Yell's stipulated testimony that nfr. 
Lynch told him that the deal was made must, of course, 
be considered in the light of the reason for conversation, 
namely that he could not deliver a certified check on 
February 23rd, because Washington's Birthday, Feb-
ruary 22nd, prevented him from getting such a check 
10 
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in titne to plaeP it in ~[r. Lynch'~ hands on the :23rd. 
ThP ~tatetnent, if 1uade, certainly \vould refer only to 
the Hdeal '' a~ outlined in the written offer of a con-
traet and included the requircnzents of con.sununation of 
the deal by si.rtniug the contract, placing it in defendant-'s 
hands. and rlelivcrin.rJ therewith a certified check for 
the earnest nzoney. As indicated, this is 1nade abund-
antly clear by the fact that immediately after the con-
y-ersation, Cald,,·ell and Covington employed Allo\vay to 
execute and deliver the contract, first attempting to get 
other 1nodifica tions. 
Defendant's conduct in this regard has, of course, 
been entirely consistent throughout: It has insisted upon 
strict compliance with the offer from beginning to end. 
It is, of course, elementary in the law of contracts 
that a simple offer, even if written, may be recalled and 
revoked at any time before legal acceptance causes 
the offer to ripen into a contract. Accordingly in 
1 Willaston on Contracts, 
3rd Edition ( 1957), Section 55, 
page 176, 
the learned author says: 
"'It is a consequence of the rule that un-
sealed promises without consideration are not 
binding, that offers unless under seal or given 
for a consideration may be revoked at any time 
prior to the creation of a contract by accept-
ance. 8 Therefore, even though a definite time 
in 'vhich aceeptance 1nay be made is named in 
such an offer, the offeror may, nevertheless, re-
11 
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voke his offer within that period. 9 Nor is it 
material that the offer expressly states that it 
shall not be withdrawn; revocation is still pos-
sible. 10 What communication amounts to a 
revocation is a question of interpretation. Any 
statement which clearly implies unwillingness to 
contract according to the terms of the offer is 
sufficient, though the \vord 'revoke' is not used. 11 
"Thus, after an offer to sell property to one 
person, a statement by the offeror to the offeree 
indicating that he has sold the property to an-
other person is a revocation. 12" 
See also 
Restatement of the Lawr: 
Contracts, Sections 35 (e), 
41, and 42, 
where the rules are set out that an offer may be termin-
ated by revocation by the offeror, that revocation is 
accomplished by a communication from the offeror re-
ceived by the offeree stating or implying that the 
offeror no longer intends to enter into the proposed 
contract, if received before acceptance, and that an 
offer for sale of property is revoked 'vhen the offeree 
acquires reliable inforn1ation that the offeror has sold 
or contracted to sell to another person. 
Of course if a promise to keep an offer open is made 
binding by a consideration, it cannot be revoked by 
unilaterial action during its effective period. See 
1 Willaston on Contracts, Third Edition, 
Section 61, page 196. 
12 
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()f eour~P thPrP is no proof, and indeed no con-
tention, that defendant here received any consideration 
or 1nade any pro1nise to keep the offer open for any 
particular tinte. See 
1 Willaston on Contracts, 
3rd Edition, Section 61(a). 
No option is here involved. Accordingly it is clear 
that when ~lr. Lynch told plaintiffs' agent Alloway on 
Saturday morning that the lease had been committed 
to another party, defendant's offer was revoked, unless 
it had been previously accepted and had become bind-
ing. This, of course, was not the case. 
Again, it is elementary, as we have seen, that de-
fendant may in its offer specify with particularity the 
manner of acceptance thereof. This, of course, it had 
an absolute right to do, and its discretion in this regard 
is not in any way limited. No one is bound to enter 
into a contract, and if he desires to do so, he may even 
prescribe seemingly unreasonable, or even silly con-
ditions which must be complied with before he is bound. 
Accordingly, 
"If an offer prescribes the place, time, or 
manner of acceptance, its terms in this respect 
must be complied with in order to create a con-
tract." 
See also 
Restatement of the Law: 
Contracts, Section 61. 
1 Willaston on Contracts, 
3rd Edition, Section 76, 
page 238. 
13 
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where the learned author says: 
"Not only may the offeror dictate the con-
sideration which he demands in return for his 
offer, but he may also dictate the way in which 
acceptance shall be indicated. 3 The offeror 
may limit the time \vithin which an offer may 
be accepted. 4 He may also, as was held in a 
leading case, dictate the place at ":rhich accept-
ance must be 1nade, likewise the manner of accept-
ance may be a condition of the offer. 5 Thus, 
if an offer requires an ans\ver by telegram or 
otherwise specified channel of communication, 
an answer by a different channel will generally 
not create a contract. 6 
". . . . Even though the offer prescribes as 
a condition and not merely a suggestion a par-
ticular mode adopted by the acceptor \vill be 
effectual if the offeror thereafter n1anifests his 
assent to the other party 10 but it seems not 
otherwise. To allow a unilateral \vaiYer of the 
1nethod originally prescribed is open to object-
ion for the irregular acceptance is a counter-offer 
and as such must itself be accepted." 
In this case paragraphs 4 and 9 of the offer of 
defendant did specify a particular 1nanner of accept-
ance and perforn1ance, consisting of three specified re-
quirements, none of \vhieh haYe ever been satisfied. 
Neither plaintiffs nor anyone for then1 have eyer (1} 
delivered or trndered a certified eheek for the earnest 
money, (2) signed the proffered contract, or (3) placed 
an executed copy of the contract in defendant's hands. 
14 
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.Aeeordingly there has never been any acceptance of the 
offer, n(lVPr bPen any 1neeting of the minds, and has 
never been any contract, as a Inatter of law. True 
Alloway tendered his personal uncertified check, but 
this did not meet the terms of the offer and was rejec-
ted. rrhis tender was certainly not even substantial 
ro1npliance. This tender was made in defendant'~ 
office. It would have been possible for Alloway to leave 
the office, go directly to the bank and stop payment on 
his uncertified check. It \vould have been equally pos-
sible forAlloway to have been killed in an automobile 
accident over the weekend, which would have revoked 
the order for payment of money represented by the 
check. True, also, Alloway testified that he invited 
defendant's officers to go with him to the bank to cash 
the check, and that they declined. Even assuming 
that this is true, neither defendant nor its officers were 
under any duty to go fourteen floors and fifty yards, 
or fourteen inches, in order to collect cash in lieu of 
the certified check required. Certainly they were not 
required to accept the responsibility and danger inherent 
in caring for a large sum of money in cash over the 
\veekend 'vhen they had specified that they were to be 
provided with a certified check, which would have been 
safe and sure against stop payment, cancellation by 
death, and theft. The legal conclusion that defendant's 
offer has never been accepted and no contract has ever 
come into existence is, it is submitted, irresistible. Al-
though the principles here set out are so fundamental 
and so universally accepted that they have very rarely 
led to any litigation in recent years, this court has 
adopted and followed them. See 
15 
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Candland vs. Oldroyd, 
67 Utah 605, 248 Pac. 1101, 
decided in 1926, and followed and cited with approval 
by this court in 1959 in the case of 
J. Golden Barton Motor Company 
vs. Jackson, 
9 Utah 2nd 210, 341 Pac. 2nd 423. 
Plaintiffs' argument seems to take the position 
that signing and delivery of the contract, and delivery 
of a certified check was excused because defendant would 
not accept Alloway's uncertified check and would not 
go to the bank with him to get cash in legal tender. 
This is not the law. Acceptance of an offer, whether 
a simple offer as here, or of a binding option, is never 
excused, because until the offer is accepted or the option 
exercised no contract can exist and the offeror or 
optioner is under no legal obligation. The acceptance 
of an offer in the manner speeified therein never is and 
never can be a useless thing, because it is an essential 
ingredient to the formation of a contract, and if per-
formed in the manner required would ripen into a con-
tract notwithstanding any reluctance on the part of the 
offeror. See 
Unatin 7-Up Company vs. Soloman, 
157 A.L.R. 1304, 39 Atl. 2nd 835 
(Pennsylvania). 
Here Allo"~ay admits that he "neglected" to s1gn 
and deliver the contract as required by the offer. 
If it should be considered that a tender of cash 
would have been the equivalent of a tender of the 
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required ePrtified check, the full and sufficient answer 
is that there never was any tender of cash. 
•'In brief, to constitute a valid tender, the money 
must be present, ready, produced, and offered 
to the person who is entitled to receive it." (Em-
phasis added.) 
St. George's Society vs. Sawyer. (Iowa) 
214 N.W. 877, 878. 
This was never done. See also : 
Leask v. Dew, 102 App. Div. 529, 
92 N.Y. Supp. 891 (1905), 
aff'd per curiam, 184 N.Y. 599, 
77 N.E 1190 (1906); 
Bane v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 
171 N.C. 328, 88 S.E. 477, (1916); 
Richey vs. Stanley, 38 S.W. 2d 1104 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931). 
It should also be observed that under the established 
law the acceptance of an offer must be clear and un-
equivocal: The minds of the parties must meet upon 
every element of the proposed contract. See 
Candland vs. Oldroyd, supra, 
and 
1 Willaston on Contracts, 
3rd Edition, Section 72, page 235. 
Certainly in this case there was no unequivocal, positive 
and unambiguous acceptance of defendant's offer. Never 
was the certified check placed in defendant's hands, and 
never was a signed copy of the contract placed in de-
17 
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fendant's hands. ~Ioreover plaintiffs' agent himself 
testified that his authority to accept the offer as writ-
ten was doubtful. Clearly if the shoe had been on the 
other foot, and it had been defendant here who sought 
to specifically enforce this ''contract" against the plain-
tiffs in this case, defendant would have been confronted 
with the argument that it had no signed contract and 
no contract was in force and that Alloway never had any 
authority to accept the offer except with the modifi-
cations stipulated in his letter of authority, that is to 
say, he never had any authority except to negotiate a 
new contract on terms not embraced within defendant's 
offer. As a matter of law it appears without question 
from the facts that there never was an acceptance of 
the offer and there is no contract which can support 
plaintiffs' action. 
Finally it is submitted that it is clear that defend-
ant's offer was rejected by plaintiffs before it was 
accepted and was thereby terminated so that any sub-
sequent acceptance would be ineffectual. An offer may 
be ter1ninated by rejection by the offeree, and where 
an offer is so terminated a contract cannot be created 
by subsequent acceptance. 
Restatement of the La'v: 
Contracts, Section 35. 
Furthermore 
"A counter-offer by the offeree, relating to 
the same n1atter as the original offer, is a re-
jection of the original offer ... " 
Restatement of the Law: 
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Contracts, Section 38. 
And see also 
1 Willaston on Contract~, 
3rd Edition, Section 77, 
page 251: 
''A conditional acceptance is in effect a state-
ment that the offeree is willing to enter into a 
bargain differing in some respects from that 
proposed in the oiginal offer. 11 The conditional 
acceptance is, therefore, itself a counter-offer 12 
and rejects the original offer so that thereafter 
even a purportedly unqualified acceptance of 
that offer will not form a contract. 13 
•' .... A reply altering in any way the method 
of payment or performance 2 invalidates the ac-
ceptance." 
And see also 
1 Willaston on Contracts, 
3rd Eidition, Sections 57, 
\vhere the learned author has this to say respecting 
rejection by the offeree : 
"When an offer has been rejected it ceases 
to exist, and a subsequent attempted acceptance 
is inoperative, even though the acceptance is 
made within the time which would have been 
sufficiently early had there been no rejection. 6 
"Any words or acts of the offeree indicating 
that he declines the offer, or which justify the 
offeror in inferring that the offeree intends not 
to accept the offer, or give it further consider-
ation amounts to a rejection. This principle is 
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most commonly illustrated where a counter-offer 
or a conditional acceptance which amounts to a 
counter-offer is made by the offeree. This 
operates as a rejection of the original offer. 8" 
Plaintiffs agent Alloway rejected defendant's offer 
at least three separate times in the course of his con-
versation with defendant's officers: First, when in ac-
cordance with plaintiffs' instructions, he proposed and 
demanded that the contract be rewritten with respect 
to warranties and rental payments; second, when he 
tendered his personal, uncertified check in lieu of the 
certified check required by the offer; and third, when 
he left, taking the unsigned contract with him and de-
claring, "If you are not bound, I am not bound." 
The significance of the fact that neither plaintiffs 
nor anyone for them authorized in their behalf ever 
signed the proposed written contract is of particular 
strength and significance. See 
1 Willaston on Contracts, 
3rd Edition, Section 28, 
where the learned author says: 
"It is also every,vhere agreed that if the 
parties contemplate a reduction to writing of 
their agreement before it can be considered com-
plete, there is no contract until the "'Titing is 
signed. 17 ... If it appears that the parties, al-
though they have agreed on all of the ter1ns of 
their contract, n1ean to have then1 reduced to 
'vriting and signed before the bargain shall be 
considered con1plete, neither party 'viii be bound 
until that is done, so long as the contract re-
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1nain~ \vithout any acts done under it on L~ithPr 
side. 19 ... Sometimes the parties expressly pro-
vide that no obligation shall arise until the formal 
\Vriting is executed. 7" 
It is abundantly clear from the undisputed record 
here that it \VH8 the intention of the arties that no 
contract should come into existence until the terms 
thereof should be reduced to writing and signed by both 
parties. This was plaintiffs' intention as well as· de-
fendant's, as is manifest from the fact that they sent 
the unsigned contract to Alloway with instructions to 
negotiate changes therein. 
The learned trial judge in this case was correct in 
applying the principles above outlined and in ruling, 
as a matter of law, that the evidence submitted by plain-
tiffs did not prove the consummation of a contract 
\vhich could be the basis of plaintiffs' action here. 
Correctness of the trial court's ruling is supported 
by the fact that the law requires, before specific per-
formance can be granted, that the plaintiffs prove their 
contract by clear and convincing evidence, which is 
substantially more than a mere preponderance of the 
evidence, so that the mere existence of some evidence 
'vould not justify submitting the case to the trier of 
the facts. See 
49 Am. Jur., Specific Performance, 
Section 169, page 191 ; 
81 C.J.S., Specific Performance, 
Section 143, page 724; 
Clark vs. George, 
120 t'" tah 350, 234 Pac. 2nd 844 ; 
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and 
Bowman vs. Reyborn (Colorado 1946) 
170 Pac. 2nd 271; 
Mestas vs. Martini (Colorado 1944) 
155 Pac. 2nd 161, 167 ; 
Montgomery vs. Berrett, 
40 Utah 365, 121 Pac. 569. 
See also 
and 
Kerchgestner vs. D. & R. G.W. Railway 
Company, 118 Utah 41, 233 Pac. 2nd 699; 
Greener vs. Greener, 
116 Utah 571, 212 Pac. 2nd 194, 205; 
Sine vs. Harper, 
118 Utah 415, 222 Pac. 2nd 571. 
It is respectfully submitted that the quantum of 
proof as to the existence of a contract was totally in-
sufficient to submit to the trier of the fact. 
POINT 2. THE CONTROLLING ISSUE OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT WAS TRIABLE 
TO THE COURT, AND THE COURT ACTED PRO-
PERLY IN DECIDING THE ISSUE, INSTEAD OF 
SUBMITTING IT TO THE JURY. 
From the beginning the plaintiffs here ha-ve frankly 
conceded that this is an action in persona nz for a decree 
of specific performance of an alleged contract relating 
to real property. Only as an alternative, and if specific 
performance cannot be had, do plaintiffs seek a judg-
ment for damages for breach of contract. (See the prayer 
of plaintiffs' complaint and plaintiffs' brief, page 1.) 
As indicated inthe statement of facts, there is noth-
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ing in the record to indicate that if plaintiffs prove their 
alleged (•.ontract to the satisfaction of the court, a decree 
of specifir performance, in personam, could not and 
would not be issued. Accordingly this is not a case in 
which plaintiffs ~ePk both equitable relief and damages 
for breach of contract at the same time, as was the 
case 1n 
Valley Mortuary vs. Fairbanks, 
119 Utah 204, 225 Pac. 2d 739 
The contingency upon which plaintiffs would ask to 
have the same considered as an action at law for dam-
ages has not and cannot happen, and the case must be 
regarded as one purely for equitable relief in the nature 
of specific performance. 
Accordingly plaintiffs had no right to jury trial 
under the provisions of the statute, 
Section 78-21-1, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
The remedy of specific performance which plain-
tiffs here seek presents some interesting and unique 
aspects. If specific performance is granted, then there 
is no breach of contract, for defendant has been com-
pelled to perform. On the other hand, if the trial judge 
determines, in his consideration of the petition for spe-
cific performance, that there is no contract, and that 
the plaintiffs' claim for specific performance must fall 
for that reason, , then, of course, the trial court's finding 
and judgment in that regard would be binding for our 
purposes, and would become res judicata. In such 
event, of course, there would remain nothing to submit 
to a jury, as it would already have been determined that 
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there is no contract, and a contract is essential as a 
basis to any action for damages for breach of contract. 
Only in the case in which the facts prove a con-
tract to the satisfaction of the judge, and the court 
finds an existing contract, but then denies the equitable 
remedy of specific performance because of impossibility 
of performance, or because of the intervening rights 
of third parties who are innocent purchasers, does any 
issue arise which is tryable to a jury under the statute. 
In this third case, the court's determination that a con-
tract existed would again be res judicata, but the ques-
tion of damages for breach of contract would then re-
main undetermined and could be and probably should 
be submitted to and tried to the jury under an instruct-
ion that the court had already determined that there 
was a contract which had been breached, and it only 
remained for the jury to assess the amount of plain-
tiffs' damages. This of course has no application 
here, because the judge in this case has determined, in 
his consideration of the question of specific performance, 
that there is no contract existing 'vhich could support 
either a decree of specific performance, or a verdict for 
damages for breach of contract. 
Even though the learned trial court (perhaps out 
of an abundance of eaution, or perhaps in order to save 
time in the event that the evidence as it developed 
should disclose the third factual situation discussed) 
impaneled a jury, at the most this jury's verdict, if 
received, would have been advisory to the trial court 
upon the equitable issues, and the trial court, having 
the duty to determine the facts, would have had the 
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right to disregard the san1e. In effect this is \\'hat the 
trial court did when it dis1nissed the case at the close 
of plaintiffs' evidence. As the evidence developed, it 
became plain that there was no cause of action for 
spP('ific perfor1nance, which was the trial judge's duty 
to determine. The learned trial court properly dis-
charged his duty under those circumstances in deciding 
the issue of fact which controlled the primary equitable 
issue, \vhich was at that point the only one presented. 
In vie"r of the fact that this case is an equitable 
case for specific performance, plaintiffs were not en-
titled to a jury trial and could not become entitled to 
a jury trial unless and until the condition precedent 
specified for their alternative prayer for relief should 
occur. This has not happened. Accordingly they were 
entitled only to a finding by the learned trial court 
upon the issue of the contract which they asserted was 
the basis for specific performance. The verdict of the 
jury at most could have been advisory. Plaintiffs have 
received the finding and judgment of the trial court, 
which is all they had a right to receive, and the action 
of the learned trial court in declining to take a purely 
advisory opinion from the jury is not, and could not 
be prejudicial to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have had 
a fair trial and received substantial justice in accord-
ance 'vith the established statutes and rules of proced-
ure. The error, if any there were, in declining to re-
ceive an advisory verdict from the jury on the existence 
of the contract alleged, is harmless and must be dis-
regarded under Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In this connection see also 
Johnson vs. Johnson, 
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9 Utah 2nd 40, 337 Pac. 2nd 420. 
It remains only to add that inasmuch as this was 
an issue properly decided by the trial court, the de-
cision should not be reversed unless this court, after 
indulging all established legal presumptions in favor 
of the correctness of the trial court's ruling, is still 
satisfied that all of the facts necessary to the legal 
existence of the alleged contract, and which would re-
quire a reversal, have been proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence on the record, as demonstrated in the 
last two paragraphs of Point 1 of this brief, supra. 
Clearly there is no such clear and convincing evi-
dence in this record to. justify a reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that plain-
tiffs' appeal is groundless, and that the judgment of 
the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER, of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLAS1IANN, 
JOHN C. BEASLIN and 
RICHARD L. SCHREP:FERl\IAN, of 
HOLME, ROBERT, MOORE & OWEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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